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able if it was based on the reciprocal examination authorized by 3:1(F).
Unlike Stewart v. Commonwealth,2 1 the opinion does not contain an
assertion by Dr. Centor that he did not base his opinion in part on
statements made to him by Wright or on evidence derived from such
statements. 22 If Dr. Centor's testimony was based on Wright's state-
21 245 Va. 222,427 S.E.2d 394 (1993). In Stewart, the trial court
accepted Dr. Centor's assertion that he did not base his opinions about
future dangerousness on any statements made by Stewart during the
examination, even though Dr. Centor claimed that he based his opinion
on Stewart's prior criminal record, and the results of Stewart's psycho-
logical tests. Id. at 244, 427 S.E.2d at 408. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the trial court's finding. The Supreme Court of
Virginia also held that when a Commonwealth expert is allowed to
examine the defendant, the Commonwealth expert can examine for
future dangerousness as well. Id. at 243,427 S.E.2d at407-408. See also
ments or on evidence derived from them, he was only entitled to testify
in rebuttal of the defense expert, Dr. Samenow. 23 This he obviously did
not do, since Dr. Samenow offered no opinion on future dangerousness.
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case summary of Stewart, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
22 Indeed, an examination for competency to stand trial or for
insanity would be difficult to conduct without statements from the
defendant.
23 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(G) ("[N]o evidence derived
from any such statements or disclosures may be introduced against the
defendant at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for the purpose
of proving the aggravating circumstances specified in § 19.2-264.4.
Such statements or disclosures shall be admissible in rebuttal only when
relevant to issues in mitigation raised by the defense.").
BEAVERS v. COMMONWEALTH
245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Late in the night on May 1, 1990, nineteen-year-old Thomas
Beavers broke into the house of his neighbor, Marguerite Lowery, a
sixty-year-old widow who lived alone. Beavers raped her, and when she
started to scream, he held a pillow over her face, killing her. Before
leaving, Beavers took four of her rings from a dresser. On the morning
of May 2, 1990, an officer found Mrs. Lowery's body. Slightly more
than a year later, the Lowery murder remained unsolved. On May 14,
1991, Beavers broke into the empty house of his fifty-year-old next door
neighbor, Shirley Hodges. When she returned home, Beavers covered
her mouth with his hand, ordered her to be quiet, stripped off her clothes
and raped her. After Beavers left, she reported the rape to the police, and
told them that Beavers had used some of her white medical gauze tape to
bandage his hand that he had cut while breaking into her house. The
police searched Beavers's house for the gauze, but instead found Mrs.
Lowery's rings. Beavers confessed to both the rape of Shirley Hodges
and the rape and killing of Mrs. Lowery.
During voir dire, the trial court refused defense counsel's requested
question as to the opinion of the jurors regarding the death penalty: "Do
you believe that if one is convicted of taking another's life, the proper
penalty is loss of your own life?"I However, the trial court did ask each
juror, "[i]fthejury should convict the defendant of capital murder, would
1 Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 277, 427 S.E.2d 411,
418 (1993).
2 Id. at278,427 S.E.2dat418.
3 Id. at 285, 427 S.E.2d at 423.
4 Beavers assigned a number of other errors. Some of these the
Supreme Court of Virginia rejected in brief, conclusive language. Others
lid not involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings provide
tittle if any guidance because they apply broad, settled principles of law
:o facts that are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in these
-ategories that will not be discussed are: (1) trial court's refusal to allow
lefense counsel more peremptory strikes during jury selection; (2)
you be able to consider voting for a sentence less than death?"'2 Those
jurors who did not answer in the affirmative were questioned individu-
ally. After the jury had been selected, sworn and given preliminary
instructions, defense counsel moved to dismiss the jury, but the motion
was denied.
During the guilt phase, the Commonwealth's attorney's opening
statement contained five references to the jury's "recommendations"
about the defendant's penalty. Defense counsel objected at the end of the
entire statement. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a
mistrial, concluding that counsel had defaulted by waiting too long to
make an objection.
At the close of the evidence at the sentencing hearing, the trial court
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove vileness. The jury was
instructed that it would have to find future dangerousness before the
death sentence could be imposed. The jury found future dangerousness
and sentenced Beavers to death.
HOLDING
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affinmed Beaver's
conviction and death sentence. 3 The court held, inter alia,4 that the trial
court did not err in refusing defendant's proposed jury instruction to
ensure that the jurors would consider a sentence of life imprisonment
rejection of defense counsel's claims that Virginia's capital death statute,
§§ 19.2-264.2 through 19.2-264.5, violates the Fifth, Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments; (3) Commonwealth's refusal to provide defense
counsel with the names of all witnesses it intended to call at both the guilt
and sentencing phases of the trial; (4) refusal of the trial court to suppress
defendant's confession on the basis that the detective did not bring
defendant to a magistrate without unnecessary delay; (5) trial court's
admission of rings into evidence when search warrant stated that police
were to look for white medical gauze tape; and (6) judge's refusing to
grant a mistrial, but instead instructing the jury to disregard a police
officer's testimony concerning premeditation, when officer was reading
from a report that had not been admitted into evidence.
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over death. 5 The court also held that defense counsel waived any
objections it had to the entire jury panel, because counsel waited until
after the jury had been selected, sworn and preliminarily instructed
before making an objection. 6 To be timely, the court held, the defense
objection should have been made at the time that the trial court excluded
prospective jurors for cause. Similarly, the court held that defense
counsel defaulted on its motion for a mistrial, and in the alternative, on
its right to a curative jury instruction, because counsel did not object to
comments made during the Commonwealth's attorney's opening state-
ment referring to thejury's role as that of making "recommendations" on
defendant's penalty.7 The court stated that to be timely, objection must
have been made to the Commonwealth's attorney's statements at the
time they were uttered, rather than after the entire statement had been
madetothejury. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to find future dangerousness, based on testimony of other




In Wainivright v. Witt,9 the United States Supreme Court held that
the prosecution can exclude venire members from sitting on the jury if
their attitude towards the death penalty would prevent or substantially
impair their ability to consider the death penalty as an option. On the
rationale of that decision, defense counsel have attempted to get rulings
that would also require exclusion of any venire member who is too "pro-
death." The United States Supreme Court held in Morgan v. Illinois10
that the trial court must allow "reverse-Witt" questions to potential
jurors. The permissible manner of this inquiry in Virginia has not been
settled.
In Stewart v. Commonwealth,tI the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the trial court's rejection of two reverse-Witt questions, and its
acceptance of two other such questions. 12 The court held that the trial
court had correctly refused two of the questions, as they provided no
factual basis upon which prospective jurors could express an opinion.
13
In Beavers, defense counsel's "reverse-Witt" question was ostensibly
rejected because the Commonwealth's attorney had already covered the
issue in his questions to the venire members. The Commonwealth's
attorney asked, "[i]f the jury should convict the defendant of capital
murder, would you be able to consider voting for a sentence less than
death?" 14 Yet, it is difficult to see substantive difference between this
question and those excluded in Stewart.
5 Beavers, 245 Va. at 278, 427 S.E.2d at 418.
6 Id., 427 S.E.2d at 418-19.
7 Id. at 278-79, 427 S.E.2d at 419.
8 Id. at 284-85,427 S.E.2d at 422.
9 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
10 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992). See case summary of Morgan, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 4 (1992).
11 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394 (1993). See case summary of
Stewart, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
12 Stewart, 245 Va. at 233-34, 427 S.E.2d at 402. The excluded
questions were:
[ 1] Would you be of the opinion that death is the appro-
priate penalty for all persons found guilty of first degree
murder when there are aggravating factors proven that Vir-
ginia has set out in the definition of capital murder?
[2] [ Would you be of the opinion that death is the
appropriate penalty for all persons found guilty of capital
murder when the Commonwealth has proved certain aggravat-
It is imperative for defense counsel to conduct "reverse-Witt"
inquiry. Similar to the objections to jurors discussed infra, trial court
limitations of any kind on meaningful inquiry must probably be pre-
served both by objection at the time of the limitation (e.g., refusal to
propound a written question submitted or to permit defense counsel to
inquire orally) and at the time the jury is being empaneled.
15
II. Default
In Beavers, the trial court ruled that defense counsel's motion to
strike the entire jury panel was defaulted. Defense counsel had failed to
object at the time that each of three venire members were dismissed for
cause. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling, stating that
the objection was untimely because defense counsel waited until after the
jury had been selected, sworn and preliminarily instructed. 16 To avoid
default, counsel must object twice: first at the time the potential juror is
dismissed and again immediately before the jury is seated. Defense
counsel are allowed under Virginia Code section 8.01-358 to introduce
evidence in support of the objection, and they should do so to ensure that
the objection is preserved for appeal.
During the Commonwealth's attorney's opening statement, several
references were made to "recommendations" to be made by the jury
regarding defendant's penalty. Defense counsel correctly objected to
those statements on the basis that the Commonwealth's attorney had
undermined the increased sentencing reliability mandated by Caldwell v.
Mississippi.17 Caldwell held that an argument is subject to objection if
the prosecutor attempts to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for
its decision. Unfortunately, defense counsel in Beavers again waited too
long to make an objection. For an objection concerning opposing
counsel's statements to be timely, it is necessary to move for mistrial as
soon as the prejudicial words are uttered. One, of course, may wait until
the conclusion of the sentence, but if the attorney waits until the entire
opening or closing statement has been completed, the motion for mistrial
will be defaulted.
M. Penalty/Trial Issues
During the penalty phase, at the close of all the evidence, the trial
court ruled as a matter of law that evidence of the "vileness" aggravating
factor was insufficient. As a practical matter, the exclusion of the
vileness issue from the jury may have had limited effect, as the jury had
already heard all of the evidence. Still, the successful exclusion of the
vileness factor in Beavers indicates that defense counsel should make
motions to strike the Commonwealth's evidence at the end of the penalty
phase as well as at the guilt phase.
ing factors to be taken into account at sentencing?
Id. The permissible questions were:
[1] []f you find the accused guilty of capital murder, and
the Court gaveyou the option of death or a life sentence,.. could
you fairly consider both options, or would you automatically
conclude that death was the appropriate sentence?
[2] Would you be of the opinion that death is the appro-
priate penalty for all persons found guilty of capital murder
when the prosecution has proven certain aggravating factors,
even when the Judge has instructed you that you still have the
option of a life sentence?
Id.
13 Stewart, 245 Va. at 233, 427 S.E.2d at 402.
14 Beavers, 245 Va. at 278, 427 S.E.2d at 418.
15 See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990).
16 Beavers, 245 Va. at 278, 427 S.E.2d at 418-19.
17 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that the future dangerous-
ness aggravating factor had been established. In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court relied on "other crimes" evidence including vandalism
and petit larceny. In reality, such non-violent crimes have no bearing
upon the defendant's propensity to commit violent crimes in the fu-
ture. 18 It is desirable to contest the relevancy of evidence offered in
support of future dangerousness. Objections at trial, or pretrial motions
18 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) states in relevant part that: "The
penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he
in limine are appropriate vehicles for excluding any irrelevant evidence,
including that which is irrelevant to the existence of aggravating fac-
tors. 19
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would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society..." (emphasis added).
19 See Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will be Used
Against You in a Court ofLaw: The Use of UnadjudicatedActs in Capital
Sentencing, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993).
DUBOIS v. COMMONWEALTH
435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Johnile L. Dubois and three other men sought to rob a convenience
store in Portsmouth, Virginia. Only the defendant was armed with a gun.
He immediately fired at Shari Watson, a store employee, barely missing
her head. Another of the robbers ordered the two remaining employees,
both male, to open the cash register. Philip Council, suffering from
neurological problems, could not open the register quickly. The defen-
dant shot Council in the chest, killing him, and left with $400 in cash.
Dubois pleaded guilty to five charges, including capital murder,
pursuant to an agreement with the Commonwealth that it would not seek
the death penalty. Dubois testified that he understood the charges against
him and that the trial court could impose the death penalty. The
Commonwealth summarized its evidence against him, and Dubois
reaffirmed his plea. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence report.
At the sentencing hearing the defendant stated that he had read the
pre-sentence report and had understood it. He neither questioned the
author of the report nor presented any evidence in mitigation. The
defense attorney stated that the record did not support imposition of the
death penalty, and the Commonwealth informed the court that it was not
seeking the death penalty. The Commonwealth did request the longest
sentence available.
The trial judge sentenced the defendant to death based on a finding
of future dangerousness. The trial judge based this finding on several
factors, including the report of the physician who examined Dubois for
competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. Dubois
appealed and challenged the trial court's imposition of the death penalty.
Dubois asserted that his criminal record was the sole basis for the trial
court's finding of future dangerousness and that it did not sufficiently
support the finding because he had been convicted of only a single act of
physical violence.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Dubois's contention and
upheld the conviction and sentence. The court conceded that the prior
convictions were not extensive but found that the evidence of the crimes
"reveal[s] Dubois's prior activities in closer detail."1 Specifically, the
court noted the probation officer's statement in the pre-sentence report
that the defendant had been involved in an attempted murder, was selling
drugs, and had been charged with other crimes that were nolle prossed.
The court also mentioned the examining doctor's finding of anti-social
tendencies and the defendant's ringleader role in the robbery. The court
found that Dubois's role in the robbery showed a marked disregard for
human life. The court summed up its impression of Dubois with the
statement that "[hie engaged in criminal activity as if it were a commer-
cial enterprise."
2
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that, although the trial court
"was obliged to consider" the Commonwealth's agreement not to seek
the death penalty as a factor in its decision, the court was not bound to
accept its recommendation. 3 The court further held that on appeal the
Commonwealth could present its evaluations and conclusions regarding
sufficiency of the evidence to support a death sentence, notwithstanding
its plea agreement. In addition to denying Dubois's appeal, the court
found that the imposition of the death penalty had no basis in passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A number of important issues, most of them unrecognized or not
addressed by all parties, including the Supreme Court of Virginia, are
raised by this decision.
I. Lankford v. Idaho
The fact situation in Dubois is very similar to that found inLankford
v. Idaho4 and raises issues virtually identical to those raised in that case-
fundamental issues concerning notice and opportunity to defend against
1 Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E. 2d 636, 638 (Va. 1993).
2 Id. at 639.
3 Id.
4 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991).
5 Id. at 1733 (emphasis added).
